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Abstract 
In this paper we describe a novel method 
for evidential reasoning [1]. It involves mod­
elling the process of evidential reasoning in 
three steps, namely, evidence structure con­
struction, evidence accumulation, and deci­
sion making. 
The proposed method, called 'RfS, is novel 
in that evidence strength is associated with 
an evidential support relationship (an argu­
ment) between a pair of statements and such 
strength is carried by comparison between ar­
guments. This is in contrast to the onven­
tional approaches, where evidence strength 
is represented numerically and is associated 
with a statement. 
1 Introduction 
... talking about 'good' measurements and 
'bad' ones ... 
does not any analysis of measurement require 
concepts more fundamental than measurement? 
And should not the fundamental theory be about these 
more fundamental concepts? 
-J.S. Bell, 'Quantum Mechanics for Cosmologists' 
It is sometimes difficult enough to make a judgement 
even if we can observe directly that which we want 
to judge. But there are many uncertain situations in 
which we cannot make observations directly. Instead, 
in such situations, we have to resort to arguments. 
Arguments, while not directly available from observa­
tions, link observable facts to unobservable features. 
And these arguments are then taken as our justifi­
cations for judgements. Obviously, in our reasoning 
process, good arguments give excellent justification for 
our statements, second only to observable facts. Thus, 
arguments should be a focus for studies of uncertain 
reasoning. 
But in uncertain situations, it is also commonly found 
that many arguments are presented and that these ar­
guments might be inconsistent. They might be based 
on different observable facts or derived from different 
parts of our knowledge or oriented towards different 
points of view. In such situations, we have to address 
the strengths of these arguments for competitive state­
ments to resolve any inconsistency. A common activity 
in such situations is to compare the arguments sup­
porting and refuting competitive statements respec­
tively. Usually, arguments for competitive statements 
are weighed with respect to each other, i.e. the ar­
guments are compared with each other with regard to 
how trustworthy they are. Then, we make our judge­
ments according to the results of these comparisons. 
It is very desirable to have some standard for mea­
surement so that we can measure the strengths of all 
these arguments to find out which statement we should 
choose as our decision, based on many arguments. But 
because there are many factors affecting the strengths 
of arguments, such measures are not easily available 
and are sometimes not suitable. Moreover, such mea­
sures may not be necessary in that sometimes only 
comparisons among arguments are sufficient. 
In this paper we describe a method for eviden­
tial reasoning based on reflecting the above ideas. 
The method is called 'RfS for Relative Evidential 
Support. In 'RfS, evidential support relationships be­
tween statements, called arguments, and their relative 
strengths, represented by comparisons between argu­
ments, are represented. 
In the following section, we present our viewpoint that 
evidential reasoning is a process composed of three 
steps, namely, evidence structure construction, evi­
dence accumulation, and decision making. In sec­
tion 2.1, the steps are modelled in the method 'RfS. A 
simple example is presented along with the exposition 
of the method. In section 3, a well known example in 
the literature is analyzed using 'RfS, which provides 
a basis for us to compare 'RfS against probabilistic 
methods and the endorsement model. In the last sec­
tion, a brief summary is given. Some other results of 
our studies of 'RfS are also listed without going into 
details. 
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2 Our Point of View 
For pragmatic purposes, human reasoners must reject 
the assertion that nothing is true but The Who/e1, 
where The Whole is the complete truth of the world. 
We understand something and we have some knowl­
edge. But at the same time, there is much about the 
world and about The W hole that we do not know or 
we do not know exactly. We have to make judgements 
based on that which we do know, and act on these 
judgements. The situation is like that in which we are 
observing a distant object and want to figure out its 
features. Because it is distant, some of its features can­
not be observed directly. At the outset, we must know 
and understand some of the relationships between our 
observations and the features of the object. Otherwise 
our observations are useless. Sometimes, we might not 
really know a relationship, but we believe it. At the 
same time, we know that some of the relationships are 
very accurate (or convincing) and some of them are 
less accurate. Generally speaking, these relationships 
have strengths of some kind. 
With knowledge as described above, we can make our 
observations. We are guided at this time by our knowl­
edge that we are looking for observations which we 
know or believe can be related to the features of the 
object. Other observations should not be made, be­
cause they are simply useless for the task in hand. 
As the observations are made, some of our knowledge 
may be triggered to give us justifications for predi­
cating the features of the object. During this pro­
cess, some predications might conflict with others. In 
such cases, we will have to compare the justifications 
supporting these conflicting predications. As a result, 
some predications with weak justifications might be 
overwhelmed by others with stronger justifications. 
We view evidential reasoning as a process as described 
above. Concretely, we view evidential reasoning to 
be a process composed of three steps, namely, evi­
dence structure construction, evidence accumulation, 
and decision making. In the first step, we collect what 
we know about the relationships between that which 
is observable and that which we want to figure ou�\ 
Judging the strengths of these relationships is a very 
important part of this step. In the second step we 
make our observations and fit them into the structure. 
In the last step, we make our decisions based on the 
result of the first two steps. 
In the following section, we propose a model of eviden­
tial reasoning which reflects these steps directly. 
1Though the philosophy of this assertion has its jus­
tification. See Russell [7] for his description of Hegel's 
dialectic. 
2.1 'R.fS-A Model for Relative Evidential 
Support 
The semantic model for the method is based on two 
abstract spaces for making judgements (statements). 
One space is for sensing evidence and the other is for 
making decisions. 2 Here we formalize the two spaces as 
two first order logics. We denote the space for evidence 
sensing as Ce and the space for decision making as Cp.3 
Evidence (consisting of sentences in the first space) is 
related to choices (sentences in the second space) only 
via arguments such as "this evidence sentence supports 
(or refutes) that conclusion sentence". We denote an 
argument that "evidence e supports choice p" as (e, p} 
and will call such pairs "arguments from Ce to Cp" •4 
In (e, p}, we will call e the presumption and p the con­
clusion. Thus, the word "argument" is taken to have 
the intuitive meaning "a step in reasoning" rather than 
a special kind of statement. 
It should be noticed that all arguments are conditioned 
in that an argument will not be enforced unless its pre­
sumption is satisfied. Thus, an argument {e, p) should 
be read as "if the presumption e is satisfied, then there 
is an argument supporting the conclusion p." 
2.2 The Structure for Evidence 
Definition: Let A be a set of arguments from Ce to 
Cp and 'R be a relation on A, denoted by ":::::;". Then, 
the 4-tuple ES = (£01 Cp, A, 'R) is called an evidence 
structure if and only if 
I. V(e, p) E A, 
(e, p} :::::; (e, p); 
2. V(et,Pt), {e2,p2}, (e3,p3} E A, if {et,Pt) -< 
(e2,p2) and (e2,P2):::::; (e3,p3), then 
(ei> Pt} :::::; (e3, P3); 
3. V(e,pt},(e,p2) E A, if p1 --+ P2 {Pt impliesp2 in 
Cp), then 5 
(e,pt):::::; (e,p2); 
4. V(et.Pt},(e2,P2) E A, if (et--+ e2) A -.(e2 ..... ei) 
(e1 implies e2 and e1 is not equivalent to e2 in 
c.), then 
2This division is unnecessary. We retain it because it 
helps clarify the process of evidential reasoning. 
3 We suggest that C,. and Cp be delineated in such a 
manner that the truth of sentences in Ce are readily avail­
able and the truth of sentences in Cp are what we are 
seeking. 
4We omit arguments such as "evidence e refutes choice 
p" because they can be represented using (e, p) in a natural 
way, as we will show later. 
6Notice that the two arguments have a common 
presumption. 
5. V{et.Pl), {e2,p2) E A, 
(e1 V e2, PI V P2}· 
It should be noticed that the constraints on evidence 
structure are very simple. These constraints guarantee 
that our structure of evidence is consistent. We believe 
this requirement is necessary so that even if our obser­
vations and their implications should be inconsistent 
in themselves or inconsistent with our knowledge, our 
knowledge itself should be consistent. 
These constraints have intuitive appeal. The first two 
constraints say that "�" is a partial order relation on 
A. The third constraint requires that under the same 
presumption, a statement always commands no more 
support than any of its logical implications. If state­
ments are viewed as subsets of the set of possible values 
for a variable, this constraint simply states that, by the 
same.evidence, no subset can be supported better than 
its supersets. 
The fourth constraint specifies that any logical impli­
caiton of a statement cannot enforce stronger support 
than the statement itself. This constraint is included 
because when (e1 __,. e2) 1\ -,(e2 __,. et), we can say that 
e1 is more specific than e2 and contains more informa­
tion. In such cases, we can say that information con­
veyed in e2 is contained in that conveyed by e1. Thus, 
all arguments based on e1 can be viewed as based on 
something which has already taken into account ev­
erything e2 has to say. In this sense, the evidence 
space can be viewed as being layered-any thing said 
at a higher level contains or covers all things which 
has been said at a lower level. (e1 __,. e2) 1\ -,(e2-+ et) 
means that e1 is at a higher level than e2. Thus, what 
said by e2 should be weaker than that said by e1 in 
the sense that e1 might have nothing more to say than 
e2, but if it does, these things are more defensible than 
those based on e2• This includes two kinds of cases. 
In cases where these additional things based on e1 are 
consistent with those based on e2, knowing e1 enforces 
what has been said. In cases where the additional 
things are inconsistent with those bases on e2, the ones 
based e 1 will overrule those based on e2 because more 
considerations are commanded based on er. 
For example, penguins do not fly though birds do. Be­
cause when we are talking about penguins, their being 
birds has already been considered, then any conclu­
sions reached from penguin considerations have pri­
ority over these from only bird considerations. In 
this case, inconsistency arises but the desirable result 
should be that penguins don't fly based on the more 
specific consideration of penguins. 
For another example, penguins have legs, so do birds. 
This is a consistent situation where penguin's having 
legs is supported by their being penguins and being 
birds. But obviously, no changes concerning only the 
legs of birds in general can affect this assertion. In this 
sense, because more specific considerations are avail­
able, less specific considerations are overshadowed and 
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become irrelevant. 
Notice the symmetry in the last two conditions that the 
stronger the evidence but the weaker the conclusion, 
the stronger the argument. 
The last constraint concerns only the presence of ar­
guments, i.e. the existence of evidential supports rela­
tionships. The constraint says that for two arguments, 
the disjunction of their presumptions supports the dis­
junction of their conclusions. In other words, it says 
that if one of the two presumptions is granted, then 
one of the two conclusions is supported. Notice that, 
by constraint 4,.the argument with the disjunctions is 
less trustworthy than the original two arguments. 
In the relation 'R of an evidence structure CS, two 
arguments might not be related. But if they are, 
{e1,p1) � {e2,p2) should be read as "argument (et.PI) 
is no more believable or no stronger than argument 
(e2,P2)". 
Some conventions can be used to denote other rela­
tionships between arguments. For example, in the fol­
lowing, we will use (et,p1) :::: {e2,p2) for ((ei,PI) � 
{e2,p2)) 1\ ((e2,P2} � {et.Pt)) and {ei,PI) � h,P2} 
for ( (et, Pl} � (e2, P2)) 1\ -,( {e2, P2) � (ell Pt) ). 
Example 1 Let { Al1, A/2, A/3} be all the alternative 
states of a system. Suppose it cannot be directly de­
tected what state the system is in. But we can conduct 
some tests on the system: 
Testl: e1, if positive, supports choosing alternative Alt 
as well as A/2. 
Test2: e2, if positive, refutes Aft; if negative, it sup­
ports A/1• 
The knowledge in the example can be represented as 
an evidence structure as follows. 
Ce = 2{et,t>}; 
r _ 2{Al,,AI,,AI3}. .Lp- ' 
A= {{et. {All} ), (e.I, {A/2}) 
(-,e2, {All}), (e2, {A/2}), (e2, {A/3})}; 
'R = ¢ u 'R.A., where n.A. is the smallest relation on A 
satisfying the constraints for evidence structure. 
This means that we have no information about 
the strengths of the arguments (other than that 
derivable from the subset relations of Ce and Cp)· 
Notice that in the representation above, evidential 
refutation "e2, if positive, refutes {Ali}" is represented 
as evidential supports "e2, if positive, supports {Al2} 
as well as {Ai3}". The justification for doing so is 
that only relative evidential support strengths are im­
portant in 'R.fS. 
2.3 Evidence Accumulation 
As noted before, all arguments are conditioned in the 
sense that argument (e, p) can enforce its support for 
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p only if e is satisfied. This provides us with a natural 
way to accumulate evidence on an evidence structure. 
Suppose our information allows us to grant a sentence 
e in L.e, then we can identify a set of arguments com­
posed of all arguments whose presumptions are logical 
implications of e, i.e. the set of all arguments whose 
presumptions are granted if e is granted and are thus 
applicable under e. This set and the relationships be­
tween arguments in this set, compose a sub-structure 
fSe of fS for any sentence e of Ce. This sub-structure, 
defined as follows, is viewed as the result of evidence 
accumulation. 
Definition: Let fS = (£., Cp, A, 'R) be an evidence 
structure and e be a sentence of £.. Then the sub­
structure fSe = {r. •• ,cPe•A.,'R.) ,  where 
1. c •• = c. ; 
2. cp. = cp; 
3. Ae = {{e',p)l{e',p) E A,e---+ e1}; 
4. n. = 'R n (A. X A.), i.e. the sub-relation of'R on 
A., 
is the conditioned evidence structure of fS conditioned 
on e. 
The conditioning on an evidence structure has the fol­
lowing property. 
Corollary 1 Let fS = (C., Cp, A, 'R) be an evidence 
structure and e11 e2 E £. such that e 1 ---+ e2. Then 
Ae2 � A.1• 
Proof 
The proposition is obvious because any argument trig­
gered by e2 will also be triggered by e1. 
I 
This proposition say s that the set of triggered argu­
ments will not contract with more evidence, i.e. the 
triggered argument set will expand monotonically with 
more evidence. But notice that fSe1M, = (fSeJe, is 
not generally true, which means that evidence accu­
mulation cannot be done cumulatively. Also notice 
that, as can be seen later, 'RfS is non-monotonic of 
the conclusions it reached. 
For our example presented in the last section, the evi­
dence accumulation process is to conduct the tests and 
condition the evidence structure on the results of these 
tests. Different results will then issue different struc­
tures. The resulting conditioned evidence structures 
with different results of the tests are shown as follows. 
The C., Cp and 'R. parts are omitted because the for­
mer two parts are the same as in the original evidence 
structure, while the last part is empty except for these 
relationships derivable from subset relations. 
e1 negative and e2 negative 
e1 negative and e2 positive 
e1 positive and e2 negative 
e1 positive and e2 positive 
2.4 Decision Making 
Based on an evidence structure fS and evidence e, a 
partial relation on £p can be defined with respect to 
how well a sentence is supported in t:s •. 
Definition: Let fS = {£., £p, A, 'R) be an evidence 
structure and e an item of evidence, i.e. a sentence in 
£.. The comparison relation C on £p determined by 
t:S., denoted by "p1 ::; P2", where Pt and p2 are two 
sentences in C1, is defined as: 
1. in the case where there are arguments in Ae sup­
porting some sentences p� such that p� ---+ Pt. then 
Pl ::; P2 �r V{et,PD E Ae,((p� ---+ pt) ---+ 
(3{e2,P�) E A., (p�---+ P2 A {ei,pi) � h,p� )))); 
2. in the case where there are no arguments support­
ing any sentence p� such that p� ---+ Pl! then 
P1::; P2 � 3(e2,P2) E Ae, (p�---> P2·) 
Informally, the first formula states that if there are ar­
guments supporting p1 or its subsets, i.e. there are 
justifications for conclusion PI, then we can say Pt is 
no more believable than P2 if and only if for every justi­
fication for Pt, there exists at least one justification for 
P2 and this justification (argument) is no worse than 
that justification for p1• The second formula states 
that if there is no justification for conclusion PI, then 
we can say P1 is no more believable than P2 if and only 
if P2 has some justifications. 
Using this relation, conclusions with respect to which 
conclusion is better supported than another is clarified. 
Intuitive terms can be defined. 
Definition: Let C be a comparison relation on Cp and 
let P11P2 be two sentences in Cp, then we say 
• Pl is less believable than P2 iff 
P1 :::; P2 and P2 1:. Pt; 
• PI is as believable as P2 iff 
Pt � P2 and P2 � Pt; 
• PI is not comparable to P2 iff 
PI � P2 and P2 � PI· 
From the relation so defined, decisions can be made. 
For example, we can have the following definition. 
Definition: A conclusion p is call a plausible con­
clusion supported by an evidence structure under evi­
dence e if and only if -.p is less believable than p. 
Many other ways of decision making are also possible 
and sensible. For example, "choosing the best" from 
competitors (as we used in the examples in this pa­
per), and/or providing some standard arguments as 
thresholds. 
But more than that, why and how the decision is 
reached can be easily explicated in 'RfS because of 
its symbolic representation. We can trace all support 
commanded by the competing choices to provide the 
reason why some of these supports are overwhelmed 
while others are taken as the basis for reaching the 
conclusion. This will provide justification for the re­
sults in cases where the results alone are not convincing 
enough. 
Returning to our example above, for which we have 
built the evidence structure (section 2.2) and shown 
the results of evidence accumulation, i.e. conditioned 
evidence structures, with different results of the tests 
(section 2.3). From these conditioned evidence struc­
tures, relationships among conclusions with respect to 
evidential support under different forms of evidence 
(different results of the tests) are shown in the dia­
grams below (for clarity, the subset relation is shown 
only in the first case). In the diagrams, nodes are 
statements in the conclusion space and two nodes, one 
above another, have a path linking them iff the higher 
node is no less believable than the lower node. 
ei negative and e2 negative The diagram for this 
case is as follows, which shows that {A/I} is more 
believable than {A/2, A/a} while the {A/2} and 
{Ala} are not comparable. This is so because the 
only argument applicable (with its presumption 
satisfied by the results of the tests) is {...,e2, Ah}. 
This argument gives some support but only to 
Aft. 
Other relationships like { A/1} is more believable 
than {A/2} and {Ala} are also represented. 
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A/2 V Ala 
Ala 
e1 negative and e2 positive In this case, Alt is re­
futed by e2, which makes {A/t} less believable 
than either {A/2} or {Ala}. So we have the fol­
lowing diagram (in which the subset relationships 
are omitted). 
Ala 
e1 positive and e2 negative In this case, Ali is 
supported by both e1 and -.e2; Al2 is supported 
only by e1; and Ala commands no support at all. 
This gives us the following diagram. 
Ala 
Both e1 and e2 are positive In this case, A/2 is 
supported by e1; although A/1 is also supported 
by e11 it is also refuted by e2• This makes it less 
believable than Al2 but not comparable with Ala, 
which has no support. 
Ala 
It can be seen that if we also know that e1 is more 
trustworthy than e2, (or vice versa), then in the last 
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case we will able to say that A/1 is more believable than 
Ala (or vice versa). It is something of a surprise that 
even this information of relative strength is not always 
needed, e.g. in the example above, this information 
makes no difference in the first three cases. 
3 An Example 
In this section, using 'RES, we re-work the example 
of "The Hominids of East Thrkana" which is the key 
example in both Shafer (101 and Cohen [41. The ex­
position of the example from Shafer's paper is copied 
here. 
3.1 The Example 
Example 2 In the August, 1978 issue of Science Amet­
ica., Alan Walker and Richard E.T. Leakey [11] discuss the 
hominids that have recently been discovered in the region 
east of Lake Turkana in Kenya.. These fossils, between a. 
million and two million years of age, show considerable va­
riety, and Walker and Leakey are interested in deciding 
how many distinct species they represent. 
In Walker and Leakey's judgment, the relatively complete 
cranium specimens discovered in the upper member of the 
Koobi Fora Formation in East Turkana are of three forms: 
(I) A "robust" form with large cheek teeth and massive 
jaws. These fossils show wide-fanning cheekbones, very 
large molar and premolar teeth, and smaller incisors and 
canines. The brain cases have an average capacity of about 
500 cubic centimetres, and there is often a bony crest run­
ning fore and aft across its top, which presumably provided 
greater area. for the attachment of the cheek muscles. Fos­
sils of this form have also been found in South Africa and 
East Asia, and it is generally agreed that they should all 
be classified as members of the species A ustralopithecus ro­
bustus. (II) A Smaller and slenderer (more "fragile") form 
that lacks the wide-flaring cheekbones of I, but has similar 
cranial capacity and only slightly less massive molar and 
premolar teeth. (III) A large-brained (c. 850 cubic em) and 
small-jawed form that can be confidently identified with 
the Homo erectus specimens found in Java and northern 
China. 
The placement of the three forms in the geological strata in 
East Turkana shows that they were contemporaneous with 
each other. How many distinct species do they represent? 
Walker and Leakey admit five hypotheses: 
1. I, II, Ill are all forms o{ a single, extremely variable 
species. 
2. There are two distinct species: one Australopithecus 
robustus, has I as its male {orm and II as its female 
form; the other, Homo erectus, is represented by III. 
3. There are two distinct species: one, Australopithecus 
robustus, is represent by I; the other has III, the so­
called Homo erectus form, as its male form, and II as 
its female form. 
4. There are two distinct species: one is represented by 
the fragile form II; the other, which is highly variable, 
consists of I and III. 
5. The three forms represent three distinct species. 
Here are the items of evidence, or arguments, that Walker 
and Leakey use in their qualitative assessment of the prob­
abilities of these five hypotheses: 
I. Hypothesis 1 is supported by general theoretical ar­
guments to the effect that distinct hominid species 
cannot co-exist after one of them has acquired cul­
ture. 
2. Hypothesis 1 and 4 are doubtful because they pos­
tulate extreme adaptations within the same species: 
The brain seems to overwhelm the chewing apparatus 
in III, while the opposite is true in I. 
3. There are difficulties in accepting the degree of sexual 
dimorphism postulated by hypotheses 2 and 3. Sex­
ual dimorphism exists among living anthropoids, and 
there is evidence from elsewhere tha.t hints that dental 
dimorphism of the magnitude postulated by hypothe­
sis 2 might have existed in extinct hominids. The di­
morphism postulated by hypothesis 3, which involves 
females having roughly half the cranial capacity of 
males, is less plausible. 
4. Hypotheses I and 4 are also impugned by the fact that 
specimens of type I have not been found in Java. and 
China, where specimens of type III are abundant. 
5. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are similarly impugned by the 
absence of specimens of type II in Java. and China. 
Before specimens of type III were found in the Koobi Fora 
Formation, Walker and Leakey thought it likely that I and 
II specimens constituted a single species. Now on the basis 
of the total evidence, they consider hypothesis 5 the most 
probable. 
3.2 'RES Design 
Following the terminology of Shafer and Tversky, we 
will call our representation of the example using 'Rf.S 
as a "design of evidence". The design is as follows. 
e 1 :  "the theory"; 
e2: "Absence of type I and II among III 
in Far East"; 
e;j: "Difference between type i and type j". 
• Cp = {B1, B2, Ba, B4, Bs}, where 
Bt = One species; 
B2 = Two species, III and 
one composed of I (male) and II(female); 
B3 = Two species, I and 
one composed of III (male) and II (female); 
B4 = Two species, II and 
one composed of I and III; 
Bs = Three species. 
• Let 
we have 
A= A' U {(e' A e", p)j{e', p) E A', {e", p) E A'}. 
Notice we convert arguments against some state­
ments to be arguments supporting the comple­
mentary statements, as we did in the example in 
the previous sections, and we have not considered 
arguments with disjuncted presumptions. 
Also consider A - A'. Adding this subset of ar­
guments to A is equivalent to adding a rule "if 
both e' and e" individually support p, then e' A e" 
supports p" . There are counter examples for this 
rule. Since we have not discussed how general this 
rule is and how well it can be justified, we did not 
put this rule as a requirement for nes. 
• 'R = { e12 -< ell e1 -< e2 A e13, 
e12-< e1a,e23-< e13} 
u{(e,p') = (e,p")j(e,p'), (e,p") E A}, 
where e' -< e" denotes 
V(e',p'), (e",p") E A, 
(((e',p') ::=; (e",p")) A ({e",p"):!:. (e',p'))). 
The reasons for these relationships in n can be 
found from the exposition of the example. 
- The first relationship is based on the situa­
tion before III has been found; the theoretical 
support for B1 is overwhelming. After III was 
found, this support is overwhelmed by new 
considerations (the second relationship). Ob­
viously, the condition e2 1\ e13 is sufficient to 
make the choice of conclusion as can be seen 
from the original example. But this condi­
tion might be not necessary. It might be true 
that some weaker conditions, e.g. e23Ae2; e13 
only; or even e23 alone can also overwhelm 
e1 and make the choice of conclusion. But 
where exactly the breaking point lies cannot 
be determined form the example and we are 
not in a position to judge this. 
The third and fourth relationships are based 
on the fact that the bigger the difference, 
the stronger this difference supports "differ­
ent species". 
The last part of n is equivalent to adding 
a rule "if a piece of evidence supports many 
hypotheses, it supports them equally". This 
is not a very general case. For example, a 
piece of statistical evidence hardly supports 
any different hypotheses equally. In our ex­
ample, we have many equivalences such like 
{e12, B3) = (e12, B4} which is because Ba 
and B4 reflect the difference between I and 
II equally. It just so happens that we can 
put these relationships concisely. 
'l(TS -A Relative Method for Evidential Reasoning 7 
Using the evidence structure built above, evidence can 
be accumulated and hypotheses can be chosen. 
Before III was found It can be seen that the only 
arguments that can be triggered are those with 
presumption of e1 or e12. While e1 is rendered 
a better evidence, the conclusion it supports, i.e. 
B1, is the best supported hypothesis. Notice that 
since III has not been found yet, B1 is equivalent 
to the statement "I and II form one species". 
After III was found This time, all arguments are 
triggered. Considering those arguments support­
ing B2, B3, and B4, we can find that for every such 
argument, there is an argument with equal weight 
supporting B5, but not otherwise. Thus we know 
Bs is more believable than B2, B3, and B4• At the 
same time, there is an argument (e2Ae1a, Bs) sup­
porting B5 which is strong enough to overwhelm 
the only argument (et, Bt) supporting Bt. Thus, 
B5 is also more believable than B1 and so B5 is 
the best choice. 
Notice that we are also able to say "B2 is more 
believable than B3". This is true not only be­
cause B2 commands support from e2 while B3 
doesn't (as Cohen noticed) but also because B2 
commands support from e13 which is stronger 
than the support Ba commands from e23 and e12· 
This concludes our presentation of the R.fS design for 
this example. In the rest of this section, we briefly 
compare the R.fS design with the designs of Shafer 
and Cohen. 
3.3 Comparison to other methods 
It can be noticed that representing strengths of argu­
ments by relative strength is at an abstraction level 
between the level of addressing factors (reasons or en­
dorsements) and the level of using numbers. This dif­
ference of levels leads us to the following points. 
In Shafer's paper [10], two designs, a Bayesian design 
(conditioning design, in contrast with total design) and 
a belief function design are presented. The belief func­
tion design turns out to be more intuitive or even more 
correct in a sense. But it is obvious that the numbers, 
both the probabilities and belief function values in the 
designs, are given quite arbitrarily. One is tempted 
strongly to question their relevance as well as their 
correctness. 
Apart from the arbitrary nature of the numbers, their 
high abstraction level also makes these two designs in­
capable of reflecting some subtle but interesting infer­
ences. For example, as we noticed earlier, it might so 
happen that only a difference as big as that between 
I and III is strong enough to overrule our faith in the 
theory, so that Ba, honouring this difference, will be 
better than B1• With the two designs of Shafer, we will 
have to change the numbers. But how can we change 
these numbers to reflect such subtle differences if these 
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numbers are related to the situation we are considering 
indirectly and are assessed quite arbitrarily? 
In Cohen's book [4], a work on evidential reasoning is 
reported. One explicitly stated purpose of his study 
is to see "how far one can go in evidential reasoning 
without measures of evidence" and the two basic obser­
vations on which his work is based are that "we know 
much about uncertainty besides belief measures" and 
"it is extremely difficult to assess these numbers." Try­
ing to circumvent the problems, he avoids numbers by 
replacing them with "endorsements" which are records 
of reasons for believing or disbelieving a hypothesis. 
The example above serves as a main example for his 
exposition of the endorsement model and is worked out 
as another design using the endorsement model where 
the numbers in Shafer's two designs are replaced by 
endorsements (reasons pro or con different hypothe­
ses). 
The obvious problem with this design is its complexity. 
The design is capable of reflecting some subtle reason­
ing, but it has the limitation that it has no facilities 
to specify the strengths of arguments. For this exam­
ple, using the endorsement model we cannot capture 
Walker and Leakey's original statement that "The sec­
ond hypothesis, we think, is more likely to be correct 
than the third". This, as we have already seen, has 
been reflected elegantly in 'R.fS. 
In fact, this defect is noticed by the author himself, 
which leads him to say that " ... an inability and unwill­
ingness to specify the relative weight of endorsements 
can limit the usefulness of the endorsement-based ap­
proach". This poses an interesting question of how 
well the endorsement model goes together with 'RfS 
because though we believe that comRarison relation­
ships between arguments form a suitable interface for 
evidential reasoning, information at a more detailed 
level might be interesting and helpful. However, it 
seems to us that such a detailed level as that provided 
by endorsements is not usually required. This is the 
case in the example. 
4 Summary 
In this paper, we have described a method for eviden­
tial reasoning based on representing arguments and re­
flecting the relative strengths of arguments. Examples 
are presented showing its usage. 
We have achieved some other results with 'RfS as well 
[1]. For example, we have formalized the method to 
be a logic in which the constraints are reflected as 
some axioms; we have implemented it; we have shown 
that when making choices from competitive alterna­
tives based on available evidence is our only concern, 
'RfS is capable of representing all information con­
veyed by any belief functions; we have established that 
'RfS is capable of reflecting the belief construction pro­
cess advocated in [9]; we have shown that absolute 
measurement [6] such as probabilities (5], belief degrees 
[8], and certainty degrees [12] can also be represented 
using 'RfS by introducing some "canonical examples" 
[10] as representatives of such numbers [2]; and we have 
shown that 'RfS can also represent many patterns of 
common sense reasoning. 
Together those results show that 'RfS is a flexible and 
potentially powerful representation method, comple­
mentary to other alternative methods. 
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